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CHAPTER 1 
An Introduction to the 
"Gloves-off" Economy 
ANNETTE BERNHARDT 
National Employment Law Project 
HEATHER BOUSHEY 
Center for Economic and Policy Research 
LAURA DRESSER 
University of Wisconsin, Madison 
CHRIS TILLY 
University of California, Los Angeles 
At 6:00 a.m. in New York City, a domestic worker wakes up her 
employers children and starts to cook breakfast for them, in a work 
week in which she will earn a flat $400 for as many hours as her 
employer needs. In Chicago, men are picked up at a homeless shelter 
at 8:00 a.m. and bussed by a temp agency to a wholesale distribution 
center to spend the next 10 hours packing toys into boxes, for the 
minimum wage without overtime. In Atlanta, workers at a poultry pro-
cessing plant break for lunch, hands raw from handling chemicals 
without protective gear. At 3:00 p.m. in Dallas, a new shift of nursing 
home workers start their day, severely understaffed and underpaid. 
During the evening rush hour in Minneapolis, gas station workers fill 
up tanks, working only for tips. In New Orleans, a dishwasher stays 
late into the night finishing the evenings cleaning, off the clock and 
unpaid. And at midnight, a janitor in Los Angeles begins buffing the 
floor of a major retailer, working for a contract cleaning company that 
|kys $8 an hour with no benefits. 
These workers—and millions more—share more than the fact that 
they are paid low wages. The central thesis of this volume is that they are 
part of the "gloves-off economy, in which some employers are increas-
ingly breaking, bending, or evading long-established laws and standards 
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designed to protect workers. Such practices are sending fault lines into 
every corner of the low-wage labor market, stunting wages and working 
conditions for an expanding set of jobs. In the process, employers who 
play by the rales are under growing pressure to follow suit, intensifying 
the search for low-cost business strategies across a wide range of indus-
tries and eventually ratcheting up into higher wage parts of the labor 
market. 
When we talk about the "gloves-off economy," we are identifying a 
set of employer strategies and practices that either evade or outright vio-
late the core laws and standards that govern job quality in the U.S. 
While such strategies have long been present in certain sectors, such as 
sweatshops and marginal small businesses, we argue that they are 
spreading. This trend, driven by competitive pressures, has been shaped 
by an environment where other major economic actors—government, 
unions, and civil society—have either promoted deregulation or have 
been unable to contain gloves-off business strategies. The result, at the 
start of the 21st century, is the reality that a major segment of the U.S. 
labor market increasingly diverges from the legal and normative bounds 
put into place decades ago. 
The workplace laws in question are a familiar list of regulations at 
the federal, state, and local level. They include laws that regulate wages 
and hours worked, setting minimum standards for the wage floor, for 
overtime pay, and, in some states, for rest and meal breaks. They also 
comprise laws governing health and safety conditions in the workplace, 
setting detailed requirements for particular industries and occupations. 
Others on the list include antidiscrimination laws, right-to-organize 
laws, and laws mandating employers' contribution to social welfare ben-
efits such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, and workers 
compensation. 
By contrast, the standards we have in mind are set not by laws, but 
rather by norms that have enough weight (and organizing force 
behind them) to shape employers' decisions about wages and working 
conditions. At least until the past few decades, such normative stan-
dards typically included predictability of schedules, vacation and/or 
sick leave, annual raises, full-time hours, and, in some industries, liv-
ing wages and employer-provided health insurance and pensions. 
Though it may seem Utopian to focus on standards at a time when 
even legally guaranteed rights are frequently abrogated, we argue that 
both laws and standards are being eroded for similar reasons as 
employers seek to reduce labor costs. Further, we argue that the exis-
tence of strategies to subvert or ignore laws by some employers pulls 
down labor norms farther up in the labor market. 
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We do not suggest that all U.S. employers have shed the gloves of 
workplace protection, or that every strategy to cut labor costs is inherently 
"gloves-off." Millions of employers comply with current regulations and do 
their best to uphold strong labor standards. However, we contend that 
gloves-off strategies have reached such prevalence that they are leaving 
their imprint on the broader labor market, creating significant challenges 
for responsible employers, government, and labor unions and other repre-
sentatives of civil society. Responsible employers are undercut when 
unscrupulous employers gain unfair advantage by violating labor laws and 
standards. Government's mandate to enforce worker protections is 
stressed by widespread and constantly shifting forms of violation and eva-
sion. Unions and other worker advocates face an uneven playing field. 
When the floor of labor standards is driven down or dismantled altogether, 
all of us are affected, not just those at the very bottom. 
The goal of this volume is to map the landscape of gloves-off work-
place strategies, to connect them to the erosion of norms farther up in 
the labor market, to identify the workers most vulnerable to these prac-
tices, and finally and perhaps most importandy, to identify the ways that 
the floor under job standards can be rebuilt. In what follows, we first 
explore conceptual tools for analyzing evasions and breaches of 
workplace standards and then briefly review evidence about the scope of 
the problem. We next trace the historical trajectory that first led to the 
upgrading of workplace protections, then to the partial undoing of the 
protective web of laws and standards—using this narrative as well to 
introduce the contents of the volume. We close by considering strategies 
to "put the gloves back on" in order to re-regulate work. 
Beyond the Secondary Labor Market and the Informal Sector 
Our focus on evasions and violations of labor laws and standards is 
related to other concepts, including the secondary labor market 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971), the underground or undeclared economy 
(European Commission 2004; Mingione 2000; Venkatesh 2006; Williams 
2005), and precarious, marginal, or casualized work (Procoli 2004). Each 
of these was formulated in research on developed economies. The con-
cept of the informal sector, first used to describe work in the developing 
world, also belongs on the list, since analysts now widely apply it to 
Western Europe and the United States (Leonard 1998; Portes, Castells, 
and Benton 1989; Sassen 1997). 
However, these antecedents do not coincide exactly with the phenome-
non this volume scrutinizes. For example, discussions of the informal sector 
and the underground or undeclared economy place primary emphasis on 
rnicroenterprises and self-employment, whereas we focus on employment 
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relationships in the formal sector, extending even to the very largest 
employers (including the largest private employer in the world, Wal-Mart, 
currently facing a spate of overtime violation lawsuits).1 Peter Doeringer 
and Michael Piores notion of the secondary labor market denotes jobs that 
violate common norms or standards, and subsequent analyses, such as 
Bulow and Summers (1986) and Dickens and Lang (1985), stretched the 
concept to encompass a much broader swath of "bad" jobs, defined by 
wage levels or advancement opportunities. But dual labor market theory 
did not contemplate direct violations of workplace laws. 
Perhaps the concepts that correspond most closely to our gloves-off 
metaphor are informal employment and unregulated work or employment. 
The International Labour Organization (2002) defined informal employ-
ment as employment without secure contracts or Social Security coverage, 
whether in the formal or informal sector. Our gaze is similarly motivated, 
but both narrower (excluding true self-employment) and broader (includ-
ing jobs that breach standards other than the contract and Social Security). 
The term "unregulated work" (or employment) is often used interchange-
ably with the informal sector, but in recent years researchers, particularly 
in Europe, have increasingly used it in a way that has much in common 
with gloves-off employer strategies (Bernhardt, McGrath, and DeFilippis 
2007; Dicken and Hall 2003; Esping-Andersen 1999; UN-HABITAT 2004; 
Williams and Thomas 1996). William Robinson (2003:260) offers a helpful 
distinction: "Casualization generally refers to the new unregulated work 
that labor performs for capital under 'flexible' conditions. Informalization 
refers to the transfer of much economic activity from the formal to the 
informal economy." 
In any case, our chief goal here is not to find the right name for 
employer evasion and violation of laws and standards, but to explain it. 
Extending a taxonomy proposed by Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage 
(2005), there are four major explanations for the existence and/or growth 
of unregulated work: 
• Dualist: Unregulated work is a lingering vestige of precapitalist 
production. 
• Survivalist: Unregulated work, including self-employment, is the 
consequence of family survival strategies in the face of inadequate 
employment growth. 
• Legalist: Unregulated work is a response to excessive regulation of 
businesses and employment (a view advanced forcefully by De Soto 
1989). 
• Structuralist: Unregulated work is generated by capitalist strategies 
to keep labor costs low. 
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The structuralist school offers at least two versions of its explanation. 
Some, such as Piore (1980), maintain that flexible employment is a way to 
meet fluctuating demands that are an intrinsic feature of capitalism. Others 
(Castells and Portes 1989; Murray 1983; Sassen 1997) argue that particular 
circumstances—whether labor surplus, increased competition, or strategic 
innovation—led businesses in developed countries to seek new ways to 
avoid labor standards and laws beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This volume explores the terrain pointed out by the second struc-
turalist camp. While we acknowledge that dualist, survivalist, and legalist 
forces all contribute to the gloves-off economy, we hold that the main 
force driving unregulated work consists of new employer strategies 
growing out of a historically specific conjuncture. 
What Do We Know About the Gloves-off Economy? 
This volume paints a picture of the ways that workplace protections 
are increasingly being undermined in many sectors of the U.S. economy. 
Table 1 provides a useful way to categorize the gloves-off employer 
strategies that we will examine. This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
Further, some of the practices described in the table are not invariably 
gloves-off strategies (though they often are). For example, subcontract-
ing can be used to push down labor standards, but it can also be initiated 
with other goals in mind, resulting in no degradation of labor standards. 
The first row of the table focuses on labor and employment laws. 
Violation of these laws is straightforward: for example, the employer sim-
ply pays less than the minimum wage to her employees, doesn't pay 
overtime, or blatantly discriminates on the basis of race and gender. 
Examples of evasion strategies are varied and often more complex, such 
as using subcontractors, temporary agencies, or other intermediaries to 
create legal distance between an employer and workers, and using the 
confusion created by that distance to avoid legal liability. 
The second row focuses on the more diffuse concept of the erosion 
and abandonment of norms in the labor market. Here, the strategies are 
myriad and, in fact, impact conditions at all levels of the labor market, 
not just the floor. Declining access to employer-provided health care and 
defined-benefit pensions is perhaps the most obvious evidence of declin-
ing labor market norms. But the expansion of unpredictable scheduhng 
practices and the reemergence of piece-rate or commission pay systems 
to drive down wages are also in evidence. And increasingly, we also see 
the outright abandonment of normative standards. 
Our focus on what has happened to both legal and normative standards 
governing the workplace is intentional. In the U.S., employment and labor 
laws largely set a "floor" of minimum standards (e.g., the minimum wage), 
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TABLE 1 
Examples of Employer Strategies in the "Gloves-off Economy" 
Evasion strategies Violation strategies 
Employment Strategies to evade core workplace 
ancflabor laws by creating legal distance 
laws between employer and employee, 
such as these: 
• Subcontracting on-site and off-
site work to outside companies 
where lower wages are generated 
via the subcontractors evasion of 
labor law 
• Misclassification of workers as 
independent contractors 
• Using temporary, leased, and 
contract workers to distance 
and confuse the employment 
relationship and reduce legal 
obligations 
Outright violation of laws governing 
the employment relationship, such 
as these: 
• Direct violation of core laws: 
FLSA, OSHA, FMLA, ERISA, 
Tide VII, NLRA, prevailing 
wage, living wage, etc. 
• Payment (whole or part) in cash 
and "off the books" 
• Failure to contribute to workers' 
compensation, disability insur-
ance, unemployment insurance, 
Social Security, etc. 
• Forced labor and trafficking 
Erosion strategies Abandonment strategies 
Normative Strategies that erode normative 
workplace standards, such as these: 
standards • Increases in employee contri-
butions to health insurance and 
shifts to defined-contribution 
pensions 
• Manipulating work hours so 
that employees do not qualify 
for benefits 
• Shift to piece-rate, commission, 
or project-based pay as a means 
of lowering wages 
• Reducing sick days by shifting 
to package of leave days and/ 
or requiring medical documen-
tation for sick days 
• Subcontracting and temping 
out to eain wage and numerical 
flexibility 
• Legal union avoidance tactics, 
such as double-breasting 
Outright abandonment of norma-
tive standards, such as these: 
• Wage freezes or outright wage 
cuts 
• Failure to provide health insur-
ance and pensions or elimina-
tion of programs 
• Conversion of full-time jobs to 
part-time 
• Instituting two-tiered pay sys-
tems 
• Dismantling internal labor 
markets 
while, historically at least, norms have built additional workplace standards 
on top of that floor (e.g., annual raises, voluntary employer-provided health 
insurance). Moreover, laws are particularly important in regulating the 
labor practices of smaller and economically marginal businesses, whereas 
labor norms are particularly relevant in larger, more profitable enterprises. 
But laws and norms are inextricably linked. For example, as a growing 
share of the construction industry moves toward cash payment, the misclas-
sification of employees as independent contractors, and labor brokers (who 
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facilitate violation of wage and hour laws), the mor 
wage contractors face increasingly difficult compel 
ing them to dilute or abandon long-established nc 
subcontracting by large businesses in order to del 
core workforce norms may shift employment to s 
pete by skirting or violating the law. Erosions of 1 
labor market standards thus move in mutually rein 
Finally, a word about the legislative exclusion 
tions from coverage by employment and labor 
certain domestic workers, home care workers, ar 
These exclusions are widely regarded as historic 
narrow (and, frankly, racist) legal frameworks for 
existed in the first half of the last century. In 
dearly in an employment relationship, and, in w 
their jobs as squarely within the realm of our ana 
Violation and Evasion of Workplace Laws 
Research on workplace violations is still ver 
oped field, and there are currently few comprel 
prevalence of violations. However, the evidence , 
nificant level of violations in some industries. Th< 
to date stems from a series of rigorous "emplo) 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in 
on minimum wage and overtime violations. For e 
found that in 1999, only 35% of apparel plants in 
compliance with wage and hour laws; in Chicago, 
were in compliance; in Los Angeles, only 43% o 
compliance; and nationally, only 43% of residen 
were in compliance (Department of Labor 2001 
(2005), in an independent analysis of Departme 
rive compliance data, found that 46% of garm 
Angeles were in compliance with the minimum 
nately, however, these surveys were largely limit 
industries and/or regions, and most are no longer 
As a result, academics and applied researcher; 
generate their own studies of workplace violate 
mum wage and overtime laws. One of the most c 
national survey of a random sample of day labo 
country; the authors found that 49% of day labon 
instance of nonpayment of wages and 48% report 
of underpayment of wages in the preceding two n 
2006). More common are studies relying on o 
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facilitate violation of wage and hour laws), the more established and higher-
wage contractors face increasingly difficult competition, in some cases driv-
ing them to dilute or abandon long-established norms. In other industries, 
subcontracting by large businesses in order to delink some jobs from then-
core workforce norms may shift employment to subcontractors who com-
pete by skirting or violating the law. Erosions of both legal and normative 
labor market standards thus move in mutually reinforcing ways. 
Finally, a word about the legislative exclusion of a number of occupa-
tions from coverage by employment and labor laws (as is the case for 
certain domestic workers, home care workers, and agricultural workers). 
These exclusions are widely regarded as historical legacies of the more 
narrow (and, frankly, racist) legal frameworks for worker protections that 
existed in the first half of the last century. In fact, these workers are 
clearly in an employment relationship, and, in what follows, we consider 
their jobs as squarely within the realm of our analysis. 
Violation and Evasion of Workplace Laws 
Research on workplace violations is still very much an underdevel-
oped field, and there are currendy few comprehensive estimates of the 
prevalence of violations. However, the evidence available points to a sig-
nificant level of violations in some industries. The best evidence we have 
to date stems from a series of rigorous "employer compliance surveys" 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in the late 1990s, focusing 
on minimum wage and overtime violations. For example, the department 
found that in 1999, only 35% of apparel plants in New York City were in 
compliance with wage and hour laws; in Chicago, only 42% of restaurants 
were in compliance; in Los Angeles, only 43% of grocery stores were in 
compliance; and nationally, only 43% of residential care establishments 
were in compliance (Department of Labor 2001). Confirming this, Weil 
(2005), in an independent analysis of Department of Labor administra-
tive compliance data, found that 46% of garment contractors in Los 
Angeles were in compliance with the minimum wage in 2000. Unfortu-
nately, however, these surveys were largely limited to only a handful of 
industries and/or regions, and most are no longer being conducted. 
As a result, academics and applied researchers have recently begun to 
generate their own studies of workplace violations, especially of mini-
mum wage and overtime laws. One of the most carefully constructed is a 
national survey of a random sample of day labor hiring sites across the 
country; the authors found that 49% of day laborers reported at least one 
instance of nonpayment of wages and 48% reported at least one instance 
of underpayment of wages in the preceding two months (Valenzuela et al. 
2006). More common are studies relying on convenience samples of 
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workers; while not representative, these often yield suggestive evidence 
of minimum wage and overtime violations in key industries including 
restaurants, building services, domestic work, and retail (Domestic 
Workers United and Datacenter 2006; Make the Road by Walking, and 
Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union 2005; Nissen 2004). For 
example, in a survey of New York City restaurant employees, researchers 
found that 13% earned less than the minimum wage, 59% suffered over-
time law violations, 57% had worked more than four hours without a paid 
break, and workers reported a plethora of occupational safety and health 
violations (Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York and the New 
York City Restaurant Industry Coalition 2005). 
Shifting to other workplace violations, we have recently seen a 
spate of studies that make innovative use of state administrative data 
to suggest that 10% or more of employers misclassify their workers as 
independent contractors (Carre and Wilson 2004; DeSilva et al. 2000; 
Donahue, Lamare, and Kotler 2007). Breaches of the right to organ-
ize unions, guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, have 
become common (Bronfenbrenner 2000). A study by the Fiscal Policy 
Institute (2007) estimated that between half a million and one million 
eligible New Yorkers are not receiving workers compensation cover-
age from their employers, as they are legally due. And while data are 
rarely available on health and safety violations in the workplace, a 
study of Los Angeles garment factories in the late 1990s is suggestive, 
finding that 54% had serious Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) violations (Appelbaum 1999). As an indirect meas-
ure of workers at risk, the Department of Labor has documented that 
workplace fatalities are disproportionately concentrated in the private 
construction industry and especially among Latino men (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2006). 
The most extreme form of workplace violations is forced labor and 
trafficking, where the worker is totally controlled by the "employer" and 
prevented from leaving the situation. Though such practices are very dif-
ficult to document, experts estimate that between ten and twenty thou-
sand workers are trafficked into the United States every year and that 
the average amount of time spent in forced labor as a result of trafficking 
is between two and five years.2 One of the most extreme examples is a 
slave labor operation discovered in 1995 in El Monte, California, where 
72 Thai garment workers were forced to work 18 hours a day without 
pay in a small apartment building enclosed by barbed wire, patrolled by 
armed guards (Su 1997). 
Employer strategies to bend, twist, sidestep, and otherwise evade the 
laws governing the U.S. workplace are even harder to measure than 
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outright violations, because such strategies are not illegal and so are not 
monitored by regulatory agencies. Academic researchers have for several 
decades tracked changes in how employers are reorganizing work and 
production, but they have often been stymied by the inherent challenges 
in measuring workplace practices and business strategies (see, for exam-
ple, Appelbaum et al. 2003; Cappelli et al. 1997; Herzenberg, Alic, and 
Wial 1998; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1989; Osterman 1999). As a 
result, the best documentation comes largely from in-depth studies 
focused on particular industries, offering a rich, qualitative understanding 
of why employers use particular strategies and of the impact they have on 
workers and job quality; comprehensive quantitative data generally are 
not available. 
Probably the most important evasion strategy is to subcontract cer-
tain jobs or functions to outside companies. The workers performing 
those jobs may still be located on-site (as with subcontracted janitorial 
workers) or be moved off-site (as with industrial laundry workers clean-
ing linens for hotels and hospitals). Of course, greater use of subcon-
tracting in and of itself does not necessarily imply an attempt to evade 
workplace laws—but it certainly can facilitate such evasion. As shown in 
Table 1, subcontracting can help employers evade responsibility for 
compliance with employment and labor laws, creating greater legal dis-
tance in cases where, for example, a fly-by-night cleaning subcontractor 
pays less than the minimum wage. 
• • Similarly, for some employers the motivation for using temp, 
leased, or contract workers is to lessen legal liability for working condi-
tions and social welfare contributions. The deliberate misclassification 
of employees as independent contractors is perhaps the most extreme 
version of this strategy, since independent contractors are not covered 
by most employment and labor laws (Ruckelshaus and Goldstein 
2002). 
In this row of Table 1 (as in the next), the distinction between viola-
tion and evasion strategies is not always clear. For example, an employer 
may subcontract with the explicit recognition that the contractor will do 
the dirty work of violating the law by underpaying or failing to make 
employer unemployment insurance contributions. Still, the distinction 
between violations and evasions is an important one, not just descrip-
tively but also legally and, by extension, in terms of options for public 
policy responses. 
Erosion and Abandonment of Workplace Standards 
The second row of Table 1 deals with workplace strategies that chip 
away at workplace standards and norms. Each example is of a broadly 
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accepted labor standard that has been eroded or abandoned by some 
subset of employers. 
Some strategies directly erode (nonlegal) normative standards gov-
erning wages and working conditions, while still retaining the appear-
ance of compliance. These include the well-documented shift over the 
last several decades to larger employee contributions to health insur-
ance and to defined-contribution pensions (Boushey and Tilly 2008). 
Indicative is a recent Boston Globe article (Dembner 2007) document-
ing how a number of Massachusetts businesses evaded that state s new 
health insurance requirements: A Burger King franchisee extended 
health coverage but halved the employer contribution so that only three 
of 27 employees bought in; a large human service provider raised its 
health insurance eligibility requirement to 30 hours of work per week, 
disqualifying 100 low-wage employees; another business owner split his 
company into smaller firms that fell below the 11-employee threshold 
where the state s requirement kicks in. 
Other forms of standards evasion include shifting to methods of pay-
ment (such as piece rates or project-based pay) that effectively translate 
into lower hourly wages. Further, some employers hold the line on hours 
of employment in order to ensure that workers never qualify for bene-
fits. Included as well are legal tactics to avoid unions, such as double-
breasting and subcontracting to non-union sources. 
Above, we discussed subcontracting and temping-out as strategies to 
evade compliance with employment and labor laws. But more often, 
these two strategies are used to evade normative standards about wages 
and job stability—a means of lowering wages and gaining greater 
staffing flexibility week to week without upsetting the employer's inter-
nal structure of decent wages and stable jobs. Again, accurate numbers 
are difficult to come by, and for subcontracting in particular, the practice 
varies greatly by industry. But a recent example shows how deeply the 
practice can penetrate: In the institutional food sales industry, fully 51% 
of sales come from subcontracted food service providers (Hagerty 2002). 
Somewhat better data are available on contingent work: The Center for 
a Changing Workforce and the Iowa Policy Project recendy estimated 
that more than 3.3 million U.S. workers are "permatemps": long-term 
workers misidentified as "temp" workers, contract workers, or independ-
ent contractors (Ditsler and Fisher 2006). 
Given their very nature, standards are more often eroded than com-
pletely abandoned—but increasingly there is evidence of abandonment. 
Under that heading we include dropping health or retirement benefits 
altogether, shifting to a part-time workforce and two-tiered wage sys-
tems, and eliminating internal labor markets. Abandonment is most 
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visible as change over time, so we sketch some of the evidence for it in 
the next section. 
Trends in "Gloves-qff" Workplace Practices 
Above we described the difficulty in obtaining data on the types of 
workplace strategies shown in Table 1. Even more difficult is identifying 
trends in those strategies—whether they have become more or less 
prevalent. We know that violations of laws and standards have always 
been part of the mix, especially in smaller businesses. But by triangulat-
ing among different types of data, our assessment is that the erosion and 
outright rejection of labor standards have become increasingly common, 
to varying degrees depending on the strategy, industry, and time frame 
in question. Some of this increase reflects more frequent transgressions 
by smaller operators as enforcement of existing laws has weakened. A 
second part stems from shifts of jobs from more-regulated to less-regu-
lated businesses and sectors via subcontracting, the use of temporary 
agencies, and the like. Yet another portion consists of degradation of 
standards and in some cases violation of laws by a subset of the large, 
profitable businesses that previously kept the gloves on.3 
A few direct measures indicate increases in outright violations of 
labor law. Francoise Carre" and Randall Wilson (2004) reported that 
the percentage of Massachusetts employers misclassifying workers 
climbed from 8% to 13% in 1995 to 1997 to 13% to 19% in 2001 to 
2003 and that the percentage of employees misclassified by offending 
employers likewise increased over this period. Researchers have also 
documented a marked weakening in compliance with the National 
Labor Relations Act over the past several decades, with a particularly 
steep rise in the 2000s relative to the last half of the 1990s in illegal fir-
ings of pro-union workers (Bronfenbrenner 2000; Human Rights 
Watch 2000; Mehta and Theodore 2005; Schmitt and Zipperer 2007). 
For example, recent research has found that almost one in five union 
Organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their activi-
ties in a union election campaign, up sharply from the end of the 1990s 
(Schmitt and Zipperer 2007). 
There is also evidence of growing evasion or erosion of labor stan-
dards. Employment in temporary help services increased twentyfold 
between the early 1960s and mid-1990s, an evasion strategy of both nor-
mative standards and, potentially, legal liability for working conditions 
(Carre and Tilly 1998). Hard numbers also document recent shifts in 
health and pension coverage. Whereas in the 1970s employers typically 
paid the full cost of health insurance premiums, by 2005, fully 76% of 
employees were contributing to their individual coverage premiums 
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(Employee Benefit Research Institute 1986; Mishel, Bernstein, and 
Allegretto 2007). Similarly, defined-benefit pension plans (which specify 
the amount of the pension, unlike a 401k) tumbled from covering 84% 
of full-time workers holding pensions in 1980 to 33% in 2003 (Boushey 
and Tilly 2008). So while on paper both health and pension benefits are 
still offered, in reality their cost has become prohibitive for some, with 
very low take-up rates for low-wage workers in particular. 
Significant numbers of employers have crossed the line from erosion 
to abandonment of standards. For example, the percentage of workers 
covered by any employer-provided health plan declined from 69% in 
1979 to 56% in 2004 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007). At the 
same time, the proportion of U.S. workers covered by any retirement 
plan dropped from 91% of full-time employees in 1985 to 65% in 2003 
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 2007, Chapter 10, Table 10.1a). 
Another instance of standards abandonment is the permanent conver-
sion of full-time jobs to part-time, a practice widespread in retail, where 
large food stores now typically employ 60% to 80% part-timers (Carre 
and Tilly 2007; Tilly 1996). More generally, companies that dismantle 
internal labor markets are walking away from historical job standards 
(Cappelli 2001; Osterman 1996). 
Beyond direct measures of changing employer practices, there is 
considerable indirect evidence that points to likely increases in gloves-
off practices. In particular, to the extent that subcontracting has become 
more common, we would infer that there is a strong likelihood that eva-
sions or violations of workplace laws and standards have increased as 
well. Again, while subcontracting in and of itself does not necessarily 
constitute a gloves-off practice, there is ample evidence that the compet-
itive pressures pushing firms toward subcontracting often encourage the 
erosion of labor standards. While some industries (e.g., construction and 
apparel) have incorporated subcontracting for over a century, research 
on other industries suggests that the practice has spread throughout the 
U.S. economy. Both the case study literature and aggregate industry and 
occupational statistics show an increase in contracting and outsourcing 
(Deloitte Global Financial Services Industry Group 2004; Lane et al. 
2003; Mann 2003; Moss, Salzman, and Tilly 2000).4 In some cases, sub-
contracting has become so prevalent that entire new industries have 
been created or dramatically expanded, as with security services, food 
services, janitorial services, call centers, and dry cleaning and laundry 
services (serving institutions such as hospitals). 
Similarly, to the extent that union density has declined, we would 
infer a likely increase in gloves-off workplace practices, through two 
mechanisms. First, in industries that had high union density, loss of 
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union membership typically results in an industry-wide lowering of 
wage standards and working conditions. Employers compete on the 
basis of labor costs instead of quality services and products, lowering 
the wage floor toward the minimum and increasing the likelihood that 
some employers will go below that floor (or adopt other erosive strate-
gies such as subcontracting or adopting two-tiered wage systems). Sec-
ond, unions have historically been, and continue to be, key agents in 
enforcing employment and labor laws, actively monitoring their work-
places for adherence to wage and hour, health and safety, right to 
organize, and other laws. The decades-long decline in union density in 
the U.S., therefore, does not bode well. In 1948, almost one in three 
workers was in a union; by 2005, the fraction had fallen to just one in 
eight (Schmitt and Zipperer 2007). 
Finally, federal capacity to enforce labor standards has waned. The 
Brennan Center for Justice reports that "between 1975 and 2004, the 
number of [Department of Labor] workplace investigators declined by 
14 percent and the number of compliance actions completed declined by 
36 percent—while the number of covered workers grew by 55 percent, 
and the number of covered establishments grew by 112 percent" 
(Bernhardt, McGrath, and DeFilippis 2007:31). In similar fashion, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's budget has been cut by 
$25 million in real dollars since 2001, and at the same time the agency 
has shifted resources away from enforcement and deterrence toward 
"compliance assistance" (AFL-CIO Safety and Health Office 2007). At its 
current staffing and inspection levels, it would take federal OSHA 
133 years to inspect each workplace under its jurisdiction just once (AFL-
CIO Safety and Health Office 2007). 
ii Up to this point, we have stayed at a descriptive level, mapping out 
Jhe types of workplace strategies that constitute the gloves-off economy. 
But understanding how we got here is critical for understanding how to 
respond going forward; in what follows, we give a brief tour of the trajec-
tory of labor market regulation that has landed us at the threshold of 
broken labor standards. 
Hpw the Gloves Went On and Came Off Again: 
The Rise and Fall of the Regulation of Work 
The gloves-off economy did not appear out of nowhere. Employers' 
decisions about how to organize work and production are shaped by 
competitive forces and institutional constraints, each of which they also 
influence. Indeed, we see the trajectory toward labor cost reduction pro-
gressing along four axes: business has become less inclined toward self-
regulation, government regulation of business has increasingly gone 
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unenforced, the decline in unions has limited civil society regulation of 
business, and government has reduced the social safety net and adopted 
policies that expand the group of vulnerable workers. 
The Gloves Go On: Rising Regulation of Work 
in the United States, 1890-1975 
The first to regulate employment in the United States were businesses 
themselves. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the vertical integra-
tion documented by Alfred Chandler (1977, 1990), as well as horizontal 
integration—for example, at U.S. Steel and General Motors—came to 
fruition. This had a number of consequences. Oligopoly power shifted 
competition away from price competition and allowed large corporations 
to pass on added costs including labor costs (Freeman and Medoff 1984). 
Companies enjoyed sheltered capital markets, since the major source of 
finance was retained earnings, and managerial capitalism flourished. To 
increase control over production processes, businesses standardized their 
hiring and supervision, rather than leaving them to the whims of individual 
managers (Jacoby 1985; Roy 1997; Zunz 1990). 
The combination of large companies, the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge, and personnel management oriented toward adding value 
rather than cutting costs led to widespread development of internal 
labor markets featuring long-term employment, upward mobility, and 
company-run training. Of course, labor unrest and union pressure also 
played a strong role (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Jacoby 1997). 
At the same time, government regulation of employment began to 
develop alongside business self-regulation, spurred to action by the 
muckraking journalists and crusading advocates of the Progressive Era. 
States led in the innovation, instituting "Workman's Compensation" pro-
grams, regulating child labor, and passing safety and women's minimum 
wage legislation. 
In the crucible of the Great Depression, the federal government 
finally stepped forward in concerted fashion to establish a system of 
employer regulation via the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. The 
cornerstone of this system was the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), which set the floor for wages and overtime. Initially, the 
FLSA excluded some groups of workers, but it was expanded from the 
1940s through the 1980s to include most workers except for employ-
ees of state and local government, small-farm workers, and some 
domestic and home care workers (Department of Labor 2007). The 
1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided private-sector 
workers with the right to organize around working conditions, to bar-
gain collectively, and to strike. 
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Later, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimina-
tion by covered employers (with a small number of exclusions, such as 
the federal government itself) on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. Legislative and judicial extensions of the act banned 
sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, age, or 
disability. Finally, the regulation of health and safety on the job was 
established by the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, which is 
enforced by OSHA. 
In step with heightened government regulation of the terms and 
conditions of employment, civil society expanded its regulatory role as 
well. Labor unions took the lead. Though unions in the United States 
date back to the 18th century, the critical turning point for the country's 
labor movement came with the organizing drives of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO)—and of the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) from which it had emerged—in the 1930s and 1940s. In 
1935, when the NLRA was passed, the AFL (prior to the CIO's depar-
ture) claimed 2.5 million members. By 1945, the AFL and CIO com-
bined claimed 14.8 million workers, over one-third of the 
nonagricultural workforce (New York Public Library 1997). 
, A less widely recognized element of civil society regulation of the 
workplace was launched in 1974 with the federal government's creation 
of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). LSC disburses federal funds to 
independent local groups of public interest attorneys, with a mission to 
"promote equal access to justice and to provide high-quality civil legal 
assistance to low-income Americans" (Legal Services Corporation 
2008a). While local legal services agencies address a wide range of 
issues, their portfolio typically includes labor, both through individual 
lawsuits and through litigation directed more broadly at the implementa-
tion of "the unemployment system, wage and hour laws, low wage 
worker protections, and training for disadvantaged families" (Greater 
Boston Legal Services 2008). 
In addition to direct regulation of employment, government took on 
a stronger role in regulating labor supply from the 1930s forward. From 
the 1930s to the 1970s, regulating labor supply chiefly meant limiting 
the extent to which economically vulnerable workers were forced into 
taking any job, regardless of the pay, working conditions, or their family's 
needs. The 1935 Social Security Act was the key law in this regard, cre-
ating income streams for several distinct groups—widows and single 
mothers, the elderly, the disabled, and those unemployed through no 
fault of their own—to protect them from destitution when they could 
not work. The net effect of the act was to provide income to vulnerable 
groups in the workforce, making them less desperate for work. 
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Immigration policy can also directly expand or contract the number 
of vulnerable workers in an economy. For example, during a critical two 
decades, 1942 to 1964, the U.S. Bracero Program managed a large flow 
of legal, regulated immigrants from Mexico. The program, aimed at limit-
ing illegal immigration and meeting the labor needs of agribusiness 
(which faced labor shortages during World War II), offered 4.5 million 
work contracts to Mexicans over its lifetime, about 200,000 per year. 
Braceros had far from full rights as workers: They were temporary and 
tied to an individual employer, and they often suffered abuse at the hands 
of farm owners and the U.S. and Mexican governments. Still, the pro-
gram offered an attractive alternative to illegal immigration, which would 
have left immigrants even more vulnerable (Gammage, this volume). 
Thus, regulation of the U.S. workplace followed an upward arc for 
the first 75 years of the 20th century. Businesses built rules and bureau-
cracies that reshaped jobs, and an important subset of companies 
achieved market dominance and shared some of the resulting "rents" 
with their workforce. Government took an increasingly active role in 
mandating and enforcing employment rights and standards; civil society, 
especially in the form of unions, did the same. Government policies also 
provided supports and opportunities that moderated the whip of desper-
ation for particular groups of potential workers. American workplaces in 
the early 1970s were no workers' paradise, but many workers were shel-
tered by a set of norms and regulations that, from today's vantage point, 
look quite impressive. 
The Gloves Come Off: Declining Regulation of Work 
in the United States, 1975-Present 
Then it all began to unravel. A historical map of the deregulation of 
work in the United States—and recent attempts at re-regulation—can 
also serve as a map of the major themes of this volume. 
How Employers Take the Gloves Off 
Starting in the mid-1970s, business self-organization moved in new 
directions. Whereas vertical integration characterized most of the 20th 
century, disintegration has been a business watchword since the 1980s. 
Corporations are increasingly subcontracting and outsourcing work, cre-
ating extended supply chains (Gereffi 2003; Harrison 1994; Moss, 
Salzman, and Tilly 2000). The public sector as well has turned to sub-
contracting, in the privatization trend that has swept governments from 
federal to local in recent decades (Sclar and Leone 2000). Globalization 
and rapid technological change have rendered market dominance more 
transitory. Capital has become more mobile, undermining job stability 
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(Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Silver 2003). Businesses draw increas-
ingly on nonstandard forms of work, often mediated by a third party: 
even the largest corporations have distanced themselves from lifetime 
employment (Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff 2003). As AT&T geared up to 
lay off an estimated 40,000 workers in early 1996, vice president for 
human resources James Meadows told The New York Times, "People 
need to look at themselves as self-employed, as vendors who come to 
this company to sell their skills." Instead of "jobs," people increasingly 
have "projects" or "fields of work," he remarked, leading to a society that 
is increasingly "jobless but not workless" (Andrews 1996:D10). 
The chapters in the next section of this volume, How Employers Take 
the Gloves Off, highlight key aspects of these shifts in employer behavior. 
Noah Zatz sets the scene by reviewing the core employment and labor 
laws protecting workers on the job, then teases out the myriad ways that 
some employers dodge or violate them. Ruth Milkman, followed by Nik 
Theodore, Edwin Melendez, Abel Valenzuela Jr., and Ana Luz Gonzalez, 
offers related discussion of the role that new forms of business organiza-
tion play in the degradation of work. Exploring construction, building 
services, and trucking in southern California, Milkman documents the 
emergence of business strategies like subcontracting, double-breasting, 
and converting truckers from employees to "owner-operators" and the 
direct negative impact these practices have on job quality in these sec-
tors. Theodore and co-authors focus on the growing phenomenon of day 
labor, especially in construction, and provide evidence from a survey of 
day laborers in the Washington, DC, area that this work is primed for and 
jwMled with abuse of basic labor standards. Laura Dresser reminds us 
that earing and cleaning work in the home includes both old and new ele-
ments: child care and cleaning work as old as human society as well as the 
recent explosion in home health care stemming from changes in the fam-
ily and in the health care industry. An analysis spanning these different 
occupations, Dresser argues, highlights a shared and structural vulnera-
bility to abuses of labor rights and standards. 
At the same time that businesses have restructured over the past 
three decades, government regulation of employers has declined. The 
laws and agencies established in the middle of the 20th century to regu-
late business still exist, and there are more workplace regulations, but 
there have not been commensurate increases in the government's capac-
ity to investigate and ensure compliance with these laws. According to 
David Weil (this volume), between 1940 and 1994, the number of work-
place regulations administered by the Department of Labor grew from 
18 to 189; currently there are nearly 200 statutes to oversee. But as we 
noted above, federal resources for enforcement have been scaled back 
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considerably. Thus, although regulation may be increasing on paper, in 
practice there is strong evidence that some of our most basic workplace 
laws are not being enforced. Noah Zatz, in his chapter in this volume, 
drives the point home by disttoguishing between the reach (coverage) and 
grasp (enforcement effectiveness) of government workplace regulation. 
Moreover, the standards set by some of those laws are weaker today 
than they were several decades ago. The core standards of the FLSA 
have become weaker as the wage floor provided by the minimum wage 
has fallen (though recent legislation at the state and federal level has 
boosted it somewhat), and federal regulatory changes recently reduced 
the reach of the overtime pay provisions by exempting more workers. In 
2003, analysts estimated that this redefinition would remove an added 
eight million workers (about 6% of the total employed workforce) from 
eligibility for overtime pay (Eisenbrey and Bernstein 2003). 
Part of the deregulation occurred simply by choosing agency 
directors skeptical of—or even hostile to—the regulation of business. 
For example, beginning with President Reagan in 1981, Republican 
presidents making appointments to the National Labor Relations Board 
began to choose board members opposed to unions, creating an 
ever-less-favorable terrain for union representation (Miller 2006, 
Moberg 1998). In some cases, businesses themselves are playing an 
important role in driving down government-mandated labor standards. 
For example, it was the restaurant and retail industries, which employ 
the bulk of low-wage workers, that led the drive to reduce the real value 
of the minimum wage (Tilly 2005). 
Alongside the weakening of governmental institutions regulating 
employers, civil society's grip has also loosened as unions have lost 
much of their historic strength. Declining union membership has been 
driven by a number of factors, but concerted (often illegal) anti-union 
activity has clearly played a role. For example, Bronfenbrenner (2000) 
has documented that employers threaten to close all or part of their 
business in more than half of all union organizing campaigns and that 
unions win only 38% of representation elections when such threats are 
made, compared to 51% in the absence of shutdown threats.5 Research 
on deunionization in the construction, trucking, and garment indus-
tries shows that gloves-off workplace practices increase as a result 
(Belzer 1994; Milkman 2007; Milkman this volume, Theodore this vol-
ume). Finally, about one third of non-union workers in the U.S. would 
prefer union representation (Freeman and Rogers 1999), another indi-
cator that the decline in private-sector union membership has had 
more to do with employer strategies than with the preferences of 
American workers. 
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With unions on the defensive and reduced to a small corner of the 
private sector, employers have had a relatively free hand to contain and 
even reduce wages and benefits in non-union settings. As a result, the 
gap between union and non-union compensation yawns wide. Full-time 
workers who are union members earn 30% more per week than their 
non-union counterparts (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). Seventy per-
cent of union workers have defined-benefit pension plans; only 15% of 
non-union workers do (Labor Research Association 2006). Union mem-
bers are also 25% more likely to have employer-provided benefits, like 
health insurance or a retirement plan (Schmitt et al. 2007). 
Less momentous than union atrophy, but perhaps more insidious, is 
the trimming of funds for the Legal Services Corporation. In 2007 dollars, 
nationwide federal funding for LSC stood at $757 million in 1980, but fol-
lowing deep cuts in 1981 and 1995 had fallen to $332 million in 2007, with 
the number of clients served dropping from 1.6 million to 1 million 
(Hoffman 1996; Iowa Legal Aid 2008; Legal Services Corporation 2007; 
Legal Services Corporation 2008b). Federal legislation also barred use of 
LSC funds for class-action lawsuits (Hoffman 1996) and limited immi-
grant representation to permanent residents and a few other selected cate-
gories (such as refugees and asylum seekers). These cuts have muted 
important voices advocating for low-wage workers' rights. 
Workers at Risk 
Whether intentionally or not, federal and state policy makers have in 
recent years exacerbated the trend toward deregulation by adopting 
policies that leave growing numbers of workers increasingly vulnerable 
to gloves-off practices. This has occurred along multiple dimensions: 
immigration policy, safety net and welfare policy, and policies affecting 
ex-offenders. The three chapters making up our section on "Workers at 
Risk" tell these stories in more detail. 
Sarah Gammage leads off in chapter 6 with a history of shifting U.S. 
immigration policy and a vivid depiction of the shaky labor market posi-
tion of undocumented—and even some documented—immigrants. 
Widely regarded as dysfunctional on a host of dimensions, U.S. immigra-
tion policy has effectively increased the number of workers vulnerable to 
gloves-off strategies, because undocumented workers are largely unable 
to access core rights in the workplace. In particular, the 1986 Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act legalized nearly three million immigrants 
but simultaneously criminalized the knowing employment of undocu-
mented immigrants. This criminalization, coupled with escalating 
enforcement of employer sanctions in recent years, consigns undocu-
mented immigrant workers, estimated at 7.2 million in March 2005 
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(Passell 2006) to a shadowy existence, without status and vulnerable to 
workplace abuse. The Supreme Court's 2002 Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds decision (discussed both by Gammage and by Amy Sugimori in 
chapter 9) has only made things worse, as the first recent decision to 
chip away undocumented immigrants' recourse to formal protection 
under law. 
Other social policies have added to the pool of vulnerable workers. 
The "welfare reform" of 1996, which essentially ended government finan-
cial support for nonworking single mothers, marked the culmination of a 
long series of state and federal restrictions and benefit reductions of wel-
fare programs through the 1980s and early 1990s, pushing millions of sin-
gle mothers into employment. The landmark 1996 legislation focused on 
moving families from welfare into self-sufficiency as quickly as possible 
and signaled the end of the government's willingness to provide cash 
assistance to able-bodied adults, regardless of their status as parents or 
caretakers.6 In chapter 7, Mark Greenberg and Elizabeth Lower-Basch 
conclude that most single mothers are better off economically as workers 
than as welfare recipients; however, many remain trapped in low-wage 
jobs or struggling to survive without a (reported) job or access to welfare 
funds—again, a group vulnerable to gloves-off employer strategies. 
Other social programs have also been hard hit by the shift toward 
reducing the social wage. Unemployment insurance today reaches a 
smaller proportion of the unemployed than it did 30 or 40 years ago: 
Whereas in 1970, 44% of the unemployed received unemployment 
insurance, in 2006 that percentage had fallen to 35% (calculated by the 
authors from Council of Economic Advisors 2007; Employment and 
Training Administration 2007a, 2007b). Unemployment insurance eligi-
bility depends on reaching certain thresholds of earnings and hours 
worked in the period preceding unemployment. Ironically, the spread of 
low earnings has reduced the percentage of unemployed workers who 
are eligible for support. 
Also expanding the stock of vulnerable workers has been the dramatic 
climb in incarceration rates, which has led to a mushrooming 
ex-offender population that faces significant formal and informal bars to 
employment. Over two million persons, disproportionately black and 
Latino, are currently behind bars, a 500% increase over the last 30 years 
(The Sentencing Project 2008): The United States has the highest incar-
ceration rate of any nation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, much of which stems from the high rates of incarcera-
tion for drug offenses.7 Of the state prison population, African American 
and Hispanic prisoners are more likely than whites to have been sen-
tenced for drug offenses: 15% of whites, 25% of African Americans, and 
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The Supreme Court's 2002 Hoffman Plastic Com-
iiscussed both by Gammage and by Amy Sugimori in 
ly made things worse, as the first recent decision to 
lmented immigrants' recourse to formal protection 
alicies have added to the pool of vulnerable workers. 
m" of 1996, which essentially ended government finan-
nworking single mothers, marked the culmination of a 
and federal restrictions and benefit reductions of wel-
ugh the 1980s and early 1990s, pushing millions of sin-
mployment. The landmark 1996 legislation focused on 
om welfare into self-sufficiency as quickly as possible 
and of the government's willingness to provide cash 
bodied adults, regardless of their status as parents or 
ipter 7, Mark Greenberg and Elizabeth Lower-Basch 
t single mothers are better off economically as workers 
cipients; however, many remain trapped in low-wage 
:o survive without a (reported) job or access to welfare 
aup vulnerable to gloves-off employer strategies. 
rograms have also been hard hit by the shift toward 
il wage. Unemployment insurance today reaches a 
i of the unemployed than it did 30 or 40 years ago: 
44% of the unemployed received unemployment 
that percentage had fallen to 35% (calculated by the 
ncil of Economic Advisors 2007; Employment and 
ation 2007a, 2007b). Unemployment insurance eligi-
reaching certain thresholds of earnings and hours 
)d preceding unemployment. Ironically, the spread of 
sduced the percentage of unemployed workers who 
>ort. 
the stock of vulnerable workers has been the dramatic 
ration rates, which has led to a mushrooming 
ion that faces significant formal and informal bars to 
two million persons, disproportionately black and 
y behind bars, a 500% increase over the last 30 years 
oject 2008). The United States has the highest incar-
nation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
nuch of which stems from the high rates of incarcera-
3S.7 Of the state prison population, African American 
lers are more likely than whites to have been sen-
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27% of Hispanics. According to Maurice Emsellem and Debbie A. Muka-
mal (chapter 8), many of those now being released from prison were con-
victed on drug offenses (37%), and nearly two thirds overall served time 
for nonviolent offenses (Glaze and Bonczar 2007). As they are released 
from prison, ex-offenders face significant challenges integrating into stable 
employment, especially since many more sectors of the labor market are 
using background checks and limiting employment for felons, pushing yet 
another population to the margins of the world of work. 
Since most forms of evasion and violation of workplace standards are 
not measurable in standard data sets, we cannot definitively say which 
workers are touched by such practices. Here we have focused on three 
groups of workers whose power in the workplace has been significantly 
shaped—and more often than not reduced—by public policy, resulting 
In greater vulnerability to substandard working conditions. But it is not 
an exhaustive list, and clearly there are many more groups of workers 
bapped in the gloves-off economy, whether because of their skill level, 
lack of work experience, skin color, gender, or other reasons. From the 
standpoint of this volume, however, the key lesson is that the workers 
most often impacted by "gloves-off workplace practices are those that, 
for varying reasons, have little or no recourse to either challenge an 
employer's behavior or to seek employment elsewhere. 
Putting the Gloves Back On 
i Fortunately, there is more to the story of the gloves-off economy than 
unscrupulous employer practices, the loosening of state and civil society 
regulation of the workplace, and the policy-fueled expansion of vulnerable 
groups of workers and job seekers. Advocates, organizers, and policy mak-
ers are increasingly developing new strategies to enforce employment and 
labor laws and reestablish standards in the workplace, sometimes with the 
cooperation of parts of the employer community. The final section of this 
yolume, "Putting the Gloves Back On," highlights a number of recent suc-
cesses and promising directions for re-regulating work. 
These drives to put the gloves back on take varied forms, but all 
inyolve reactivating government, unions, or other elements of civil society 
Jo, restore worker protections. In chapter 9 Amy Sugimori surveys a wide 
range of innovative state and local initiatives to safeguard the rights of 
immigrant workers in the context of increasingly punitive policy imple-
mentation and escalating numbers of workplace violations. Stephen 
Lerner, Jill Hurst, and Glenn Adler, themselves architects of some of the 
.most successful union organizing strategies of the last two decades, 
describe in chapter 10 how the Service Employees International Union 
successfully reorganized the building cleaning industry against steep odds 
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and assess the prospects for a repeat performance with security guards. In 
chapter 11 Paul Sonn and Stephanie Luce trace the broadening and deep-
ening of the living wage movement, which has stepped up from local to 
state to national victories, and now is even beginning to go global. David 
Weil closes the volume in chapter 12 by exploring under what circum-
stances the business community may accept or even welcome new regula-
tions and under what circumstances it closes ranks to oppose regulation. 
Weil particularly focuses on potential divergences in perceived self-
interest between large and small businesses and between "high road" 
employers who already exceed proposed standards and their "low road" 
counterparts who would feel the bite of new regulation. 
This volume does not exhaust the full variety of illegal or evasive strate-
gies by employers, the groups of vulnerable workers, or the new solutions 
being developed on the ground. Instead, our goal is to put the gloves-off 
economy squarely onto the radar screen of policy makers, researchers, and 
practitioners, because it is our belief that without intervention, the trend 
toward unregulated work will only worsen. Given the often hidden nature 
of these jobs and workplace strategies, researchers will need to apply inno-
vative methods to more accurately map such practices. The search for solu-
tions, too, is at the stage of experimentation. There is no returning to the 
typical job of 1970 (nor would we want to go there, for any number of rea-
sons). But as the chapters in this volume show, there are promising models 
for revitalizing job standards in the 21st-century workplace as well as prom-
ising examples of the diverse coalitions that are needed to drive change. In 
the end, the core truth is that workers, government, unions, and responsi-
ble employers all have a stake in finding ways to put the gloves of worker 
protections back on. 
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Endnotes 
1
 Likewise, informal and underground transactions violate or evade a wide range 
of laws, notably tax laws, while we limit our attention to avoidance of labor laws and 
standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
V . 2 See Department of State (2004), Bales, Fletcher, i 
etal. (2003), and Department of Justice (2004). 
3
 While employment law does provide for the means t< 
accountable, in practice establishing this joint liability 
consuming; see Zatz in this volume. 
. .< * In addition to industry studies, a rare systematic look 
a Bwseau of Labor Statistics survey on contracting-out she 
ing of five functions over the 1980s (Abraham and Taylor '. 
5
 The frequency and credibility of threats to relocate h< 
ef free trade agreements, most notably the North Ameri< 
which have removed restrictions on U.S. corporate investi 
barriers to goods produced abroad by U.S. companies or tl 
*
l
 '
eIn a less-noticed change that actually generated most 
Congress excluded many legal noncitizen immigrants wli 
States from federally funded Temporary Assistance for N& 
icaid health insurance, food stamps, and SSI disability pi 
wse their own funds to aid immigrants, and some of these 
back since 1996). During the 1990s, the states also phased 
era! assistance programs, the income support program oi 
adults without dependent children. 
,
 7
 Drug offences accounted for 1 in 4 of those in jail in 
R>% of federal prison inmates in 2001 (Sentencing Project 
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